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1. “LAWFARE DESCRIBES A METHOD OF WARFARE WHERE 
LAW IS USED AS A MEANS OF REALIZING A MILITARY 
OBJECTIVE.” 
— Major General Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF (Ret.)1 
When four planes, commandeered by al-Qaeda hijackers, struck 
the economic and military heart of the United States, international 
                                                                                                                                     
 
1. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian 
Values in 21st Century Conflicts 4 (Carr Ctr. Human Rights, John F. Kennedy Sch. Gov’t, 
Harvard Univ., Working Paper, 2001) [hereinafter Dunlap Working Paper]. 
2016] WHAT DOES LAWFARE MEAN? 3 
law’s relationship with terrorism, war, and national security was 
altered.2 The proliferation and institutionalization of international law 
that had followed the Second World War was suddenly met with 
increased resistance.3 The term “lawfare,” upon entering the 
concurrent discourse, initially described what observers perceived as 
the novel use of international law within situations of traditional or 
asymmetrical conflict, before later developing into a blanket term of 
competing meanings. 
Major General Charles J. Dunlap Jr. of the United States Air 
Force first popularized lawfare in a paper describing the challenges 
posed by international law when engaging in a modern military 
intervention. Lawfare, he posited, was an innovative form of warfare 
in which law was employed to achieve a traditional military 
objective.4 Years later Dunlap would evolve his understanding of the 
term, holding that lawfare constituted “the strategy of using – or 
misusing – law as a substitute for traditional military means to 
achieve a warfighting objective.”5 When Dunlap sought to define the 
term, he claimed ideological neutrality. Lawfare, like traditional 
weaponry, could be wielded for legitimate or illegitimate purposes.6 
Furthermore, lawfare conveyed limited descriptive potential. Dunlap 
would later explain that lawfare was intended to focus “principally on 
circumstances where law can create the same or similar effects as 
those ordinarily sought from conventional warmaking approaches.”7 
Yet when the term lawfare entered the public vernacular and policy 
                                                                                                                                     
2. For a discussion of how the events of September 11, 2001 have effected or been used 
to justify a ‘new paradigm’ in international law, see Stephen P. Marks, International Law and 
the ‘War on Terrorism’: Post 9/11 Responses by the United States and Asia Pacific Countries, 
1 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 43, 48 (2006). See also Anthea Roberts, Righting Wrongs or Wronging 
Rights? The United States and Human Rights Post-September 11, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 721 
(2004). See generally DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, FROM 9-11 TO THE ‘IRAQ WAR 2003’: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY (2004). 
3. For a detailed and critical overview of the Bush Administration’s approach to 
international law, see JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015). 
4. As Dunlap recognized, the term is widely believed to have originated in a paper 
published as part of an edited volume in 1975. See Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1. The 
authors used the term lawfare to decry the adversarial nature of western legal systems. See 
John Carlson & Neville Yeomans, Whither Goeth the Law – Humanity or Barbarity, in THE 
WAY OUT: RADICAL ALTERNATIVES IN AUSTRALIA 155 (David Crossley & Margaret Smith 
eds., 1975). 
5. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Lawfare Today…and Tomorrow, 87 INT’L L. STUD. SER. US 
NAVAL WAR COL. 315, 315 (2011) [hereinafter Dunlap Today and Tomorrow]. 
6. Id. at 315-16. 
7. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 121, 122 (2010) [hereinafter Dunlap Apologia]. 
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discourses that followed the September 11th attacks, its meaning 
became blurred and its uses varied. 
Today, there is no consensus as to lawfare’s meaning.8 It has, 
however, moved from Dunlap’s purportedly neutral connotations to 
assume a pejorative or polemic tone within popular and political 
speech.9 The propagation of the term lawfare that followed Dunlap’s 
early framing of the neologism, its influence on the concurrent 
discourse, has occurred on the margins of the US-led War on Terror, 
though it is not limited to these events. 
Within such a context, lawfare has evolved to describe and 
denounce various forms of international legal engagement.10 Often, 
though not exclusively, these usages are directed towards non-state 
actors: individuals, non-governmental organizations, international 
institutions, or sub-state militant groups. Descriptions or accusations 
of lawfare have occurred in relation to the general and the specific. 
Lawfare has been understood as the imposition or manipulation of 
international legal standards to confine traditional military means and 
operations and to limit both state responses to terrorism and the use of 
force.11 Those who employ the precepts of international law, often 
before international fora, to shame countries like the United States or 
Israel have been accused of engaging in lawfare.12 The use of human 
                                                                                                                                     
8. See Michael P. Scharf & Elizabeth Andersen, Is Lawfare Worth Defining? - Report of 
the Cleveland Experts Meeting - September 11, 2010, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 11, 13-15 
(2010); see also Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries – Part Two, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 
(May 22, 2003), http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/lawfare-latest-asymmetries—-part-
two/p6191; Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 18, 2003), 
http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/lawfare-latest-asymmetries/.p5772.  
9. David Luban, Carl Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 457, 458 (2010). 
10. For a more detailed account of how the term “lawfare” has evolved since being 
reintroduced by Charles Dunlap, see Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Semiotic Definition of Lawfare, 43 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 29, 51-57 (2011). See also Wouter G. Werner, The Curious Career 
of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 61 (2010). 
11. For example, the position assumed by the Council on Foreign Relations described 
lawfare as “a strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to 
achieve military objectives.” This understanding of lawfare does not differ from Dunlap’s 
offering but the Council held, in accordance with this meaning, that “[e]ach operation 
conducted by US military results in new and expanding efforts by groups and countries to use 
lawfare to respond to military force.” See Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, supra note 8. 
12. W. Chadwick Austin and Antony Barone Kolenc, for example, argue that the 
International Criminal Court is vulnerable to abuse by the United States’ adversaries who may 
seek to shame the United States by misusing the Court’s investigative processes, filing dubious 
complaints with the Court, or by engaging the media in relation to ICC proceedings to generate 
international pressure against the United States. See W. Chadwick Austin & Antony Barone 
Kolenc, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf? The International Criminal Court as a Weapon of 
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shields by non-state actors engaged in asymmetrical warfare has been 
held to constitute lawfare.13 Further, the use of libel laws to attempt to 
silence groups who “oppose” the threat of “militant Islam” and seek 
to expose the means of terrorist financing have been described as acts 
of lawfare.14 Lawfare has also been used to label and deride the 
efforts of lawyers and organizations representing foreign nationals 
held at the Guantánamo Bay detainment camp in Cuba.15 Finally, and 
in close association to Dunlap’s intended use of the term, the label of 
lawfare has described the strategic use of international law by States 
for the purpose of achieving a particular, often military, objective.16 
This paper is built around several prominent quotations which 
claim to either define lawfare or describe what the user deems as an 
act of lawfare. It will explore these varied uses of the term and 
attempt to understand what the significance of lawfare’s advent is for 
the practice and function of international law. It accepts that a 
consensus definition of the term will remain elusive and does not 
attempt to provide one. Instead, it borrows from Alison Young’s 
argument that to better understand a particular discourse, and our 
investment in it, we should “flow with the current meaning.”17 As 
such, it is not consumed by the definitional question of what lawfare 
is. Rather, it asks what the label of lawfare means for both the 
understanding and practice of international law. 
In exploring this question, it attempts to (re)frame the debate that 
surrounds lawfare. Currently, this exists amongst three broad camps: 
those who understand lawfare as the use and abuse of international 
law to threaten state interests; those who view it as a rhetorical device 
intended to discredit parties who attempt to engage with international 
law as a means to ensure accountability and compliance; and those 
who describe lawfare as a weapon, the legitimacy of which is defined 
by its user’s intentions. 
                                                                                                                                     
Asymmetric Warfare, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 291 (2006); see also David Scheffer, 
Whose Lawfare Is It, Anyway?, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 215, 223 (2010); infra discussion 
in Sections 2, 3. 
13. See infra Sections 2, 7.  
14. See infra Section 6.   
15. See infra Sections 4, 5.  
16. See infra Section 7.   
17. ALISON YOUNG, FEMININITY IN DISSENT 43 (1990); see also Anne Orford, Muscular 
Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
679, 682 (1999). 
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A 2010 symposium hosted by Case Western Reserve’s School of 
Law, titled LAWFARE!, featured proponents of each view.18 Many 
from all sides of the lawfare debate presented positions that held the 
notion of lawfare as novel—an observed phenomenon that now 
assumed a prominent position within an increasingly internationalized 
environment.19 While this view was widely accepted, manifestations 
of what is commonly termed lawfare often predate the term’s 
popularization. Alongside the proliferation of international law 
throughout the twentieth century it is, of course, possible to find 
myriad examples of legal engagements and arguments that may 
conform with what is now broadly termed lawfare. Furthermore, 
critical framings of lawfare that explicitly or implicitly view it as 
novel and contextual risk erroneously preserving it within a singular 
time and place. Most often this is the United States of George W. 
Bush and the War on Terror.20 What is popularly held to constitute 
lawfare is neither novel nor contextual, yet the implications of the 
term’s use may be significant. 
Lawfare, however, as most commonly understood and applied, 
has evolved within political and popular discourses to serve as a 
warning of the corrosive effects and potential hazards of international 
law.21 Opponents of this framing have argued that the labelling of 
international legal engagements as lawfare has become a 
neoconservative doctrine whose “real target is international law 
itself.”22 Thus, lawfare is presented not as a legal argument, but 
                                                                                                                                     
18. For an overview of the symposium, see Michael P. Scharf & Shannon Pagano, 
Foreward: LAWFARE!, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010). The papers of the participants 
are contained throughout all of 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. (2010-2011).  
19. E.g., Craig H. Allen, Command of the Commons Boasts: An Invitation to Lawfare, 83 
INT’L L. STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR COL. 21 (2007); see also Michael J. Lebowitz, The 
Value of Claiming Torture: An Analysis of Al-Qaeda’s Tactical Lawfare Strategy and Efforts 
to Fight Back, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 357 (2010); Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12. 
20. For example, see Michael Kearney’s explanation of lawfare having “emerged in 
response to human rights litigation during the ‘war on terror’, and rapidly progressed from 
conservative newspaper opinions and blogs to legal and political academic journals.” Michael 
Kearney, Lawfare, Legitimacy and Resistance: The Weak and the Law, 16 PAL. Y.B. INT’L L. 
79, 88 (2010). 
21. The editorial board of the Wall Street Journal has warned about the dangers of 
lawfare, holding that “however well our troops do on the battlefield, a reality of modern times 
is that the U.S. can still lose the war on terror in the courtroom.” See The Lawfare Wars, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703467004575463
721720570734; see also David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Lawfare, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 
2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117220137149816987. 
22. Scott Horton, The Dangers of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 163, 167 
(2010-2011); see also Scheffer, supra note 12, at 217. 
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instead as a policy prescription. Leila Nadya Sadat and Jing Geng 
have argued that the use of the term, popularly conceived, constitutes 
“an effort to attack and dismantle legal norms – and even some legal 
or international institutions – in order to promote the efforts of 
America’s (or Israel’s) military.”23 
When one observes contemporary applications of lawfare, it is 
often intended to decry or delegitimize arguments that themselves 
draw upon international legal principles. Viewed singularly, this 
provides credence to the understanding of lawfare espoused by Sadat 
and Geng. But as several observers have noted, nearly all States 
engage with international law in a manner that can fit comfortably 
within common conceptions of lawfare.24 Thus, when observing the 
debate that surrounds the use of the term, it becomes evident that 
pejorative or polemic applications of lawfare are often decrying a 
particular use of international law by a particular type of actor. When 
framing the lawfare debate or articulating a response to accusations of 
lawfare that are intended to delegitimize such specific uses of 
international law, it is prudent to understand the application of the 
label not as a general means of attacking or dismantling legal norms, 
but as a particular strategy intended to limit access to international 
justice. 
2. “THE FIRST TYPE OF LAWFARE IS ASYMMETRICAL 
WARFARE. DURING THE RECENT CONFLICT WITH IRAQ, 
ALLIED FORCES WERE THE TARGET OF A PERSISTENT 
LAWFARE CAMPAIGN. EVEN BEFORE THE CONFLICT BEGAN, 
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVISTS USED LEGAL MEANS TO TRY TO 
DECLARE MILITARY ACTION ILLEGITIMATE. IN 
COORDINATION WITH IRAQI AUTHORITIES, HUMAN SHIELDS 
WERE POSITIONED AT PROSPECTIVE TARGETS TO DISRUPT 
AMERICAN WAR PLANS.” 
— Council on Foreign Relations25 
Lawfare, as initially described by Dunlap, was a reaction to the 
perception that international law was assuming a more prominent and 
                                                                                                                                     
23. Leila Nadya Sadat & Jing Geng, On Legal Subterfuge and the So-Called “Lawfare” 
Debate, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 153, 160 (2010-2011). 
24. Allen, supra note 19, at 36. See generally ORDE F. KITTRIE, LAWFARE: LAW AS A 
WEAPON OF WAR (2016).  
25. Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, supra note 8. 
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strategic role within situations of international armed conflict.26 With 
increasing frequency, actors engaged in traditional conflict situations 
were believed to rely upon what Dunlap characterized as lawfare 
within “circumstances where law can create the same or similar 
effects as those ordinarily sought from conventional war making 
approaches.”27 Upon popularizing the term, Dunlap evolved his 
understanding of lawfare to include what he perceived to be the 
cynical manipulation of particular uses of international law.28 
Accordingly, and with what was presented as increased frequency, the 
United States’ opponents were understood to nefariously engage the 
rule of law and the humanitarian values it represents to create a 
perception that the United States is waging war in violation of 
international law.29 
This notion of lawfare is emblematic of the view forwarded by 
the Council on Foreign Relations. This warned, in regards to the Iraq 
War, that international activists were turning to legal means to 
demonstrate the illegitimacy of the military operation.30 Several 
commentators have lent credence to this notion of lawfare, holding 
that it endeavors to “gain a moral advantage over your enemy in the 
court of world opinion.”31 In response, they have declared that “[t]he 
U.S. must go on both the legal and public diplomacy offensive, 
utilizing such aggressive litigation tactics as seeking sanctions against 
lawyers who make frivolous arguments or violate security 
regulations.”32 Often, nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) are 
perceived as the primary perpetrators of this notion of lawfare and are 
increasingly held to function in opposition to a State’s security 
interests.33 
The currency that international law-based claims carry within the 
public sphere is viewed as an extension of the general influence that 
international law has assumed within occurrences of international 
                                                                                                                                     
26. See Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1, at 2-4. 
27. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, at 122; see also Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare: A 
Decisive Element of 21st Century Conflicts?, 54 JOINT FORCES Q. 34 (2009) [hereinafter 
Dunlap Conflicts].   
28. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7.   
29. Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1, at 4. 
30. Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, supra note 8. 
31. Rivkin & Casey, supra note 21. 
32. Id. 
33. See generally Neve Gordon, Human Rights as a Security Threat: Lawfare and the 
Campaign against Human Rights NGOs, 48 L. & SOC’Y REV. 311, 311-12 (2014). 
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armed conflict.34 Some, observing the increasing application of 
international law from within military establishments, have been 
inclined to interpret such uses as an obstruction. General Wesley 
Clark, who served as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe during the 
NATO mission in Kosovo, described the challenges posed by 
increased legal oversight within a military campaign: 
The processes of approving the targets, striking the targets, 
reading the results, and restriking were confusing. The original 
plans had presumed that the [Supreme Allied Commander, 
Europe] would have the authority to strike targets within overall 
categories specified by NATO political leaders, but Washington 
had introduced a target-by-target approval requirement. The other 
Allies began to be increasingly demanding, too. It was British 
law that targets struck by any aircraft based in the United 
Kingdom had to be approved by their lawyers, the French 
demanded greater insight into the targeting and strikes, and of 
course there had to be continuing consultation with NATO 
headquarters and with other countries, too.35 
The NATO intervention in Kosovo and the accompanying campaign 
against Serbia are held by many, from an operational perspective (jus 
in bello), to represent “a high-water mark of the influence of 
international law in military interventions.”36 Certain commentators, 
opposed to the heightened influence of international law on 
operational decision-making, described the perceived restrictive or 
prohibitive function of international law as lawfare. Often held to be 
encouraged by NGOs and as an impediment to the achievement of 
military or security objectives, opponents of the restrictive use of 
international law claimed:  
One of the most striking features of the Kosovo campaign, in 
fact, was the remarkably direct role lawyers played in managing 
combat operations – to a degree  unprecedented in previous 
wars . . . The role played by lawyers in this war should also be 
                                                                                                                                     
34. Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1, at 1. 
35. WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR: BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND THE FUTURE 
OF COMBAT 224 (2001). 
36. Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1, at 1-2; see also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL 
WAR: KOSOVO AND BEYOND 197-98, 200, 207 (2000); Adam Roberts, NATO’s ‘Humanitarian 
War’ over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL. & STRATEGY 102, 102 (1999). 
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sobering – indeed alarming – for devotees of power politics who 
denigrate the impact of law on international conflict.37 
The term lawfare, in response, served as a descriptive denunciation of 
the perceived rise and prohibitive influence of international law 
within conflict situations. Though Dunlap and others would later 
insist that understandings of lawfare were intended to maintain a 
neutral connotation, these common applications of the term would 
retain a pejorative association.38 
As the asymmetrical warfare of the twenty-first century replaced 
the traditional wars of the twentieth century, an amended 
understanding of certain uses of international law – termed lawfare –  
employed as a means of achieving a military objective, increasingly 
became associated with the tactics of non-state militant groups.39 The 
label of lawfare, now applied to an ever-broadening scope of legal 
engagements within instances of armed conflict, was held to define 
occasions of asymmetrical warfare in which “a group or state that is 
facing a nation committed to comply with the laws of war will choose 
to openly violate the law not only for the tactical advantage gained 
but for the strategic benefit that arises.”40 
The 2003 US-led war in Iraq provided the archetypical example. 
Lawfare came to describe the tactics of US adversaries. These 
included:  
. . . attacking from protected places and using protected places or 
objects as weapons storage sites, fighting without wearing a 
proper uniform, using human shields to protect military targets, 
using protected symbols to gain military advantage, and 
murdering of prisoners or others who deserve protection.41  
In each of these observed instances, the term lawfare is employed to 
describe “an inferior force [using] the superior force’s commitment to 
adhere to the law of war to its tactical advantage.”42 
                                                                                                                                     
37. Richard K. Betts, Compromised Command: Inside NATO’s First War, 80 FOREIGN 
AFF. 126, 129 (2001). 
38. Dunlap Today and Tomorrow, supra note 5, at 315. 
39. See Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12; see also Dale Stephens, The Age of Lawfare, 87 
INT’L L. STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR COL. 327, 330 (2011); Kittrie, supra note 24, at 340-41. 
40. Eric Talbot Jensen, The ICJ’s “Uganda Wall”: A Barrier to the Principle of 
Distinction and an Entry Point for Lawfare, 35 DENV. J. INT’L & POL’Y  241, 269 (2007). 
41. Id. at 269-70.  
42. Id. at 270. 
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Thus, three related notions of lawfare emerged from the term’s 
description of the use of international law within instances of armed 
conflict. The first, as initially identified by Dunlap, employed law and 
legal argumentation to imply that the United States was engaging in a 
war and actions that violated fundamental principles of international 
law. The second notion of lawfare held that through the increased 
influence of international law, law served as a prohibitive intrusion on 
US efforts to achieve operational and security-based objectives. The 
final notion suggests that the United States’ adversaries used a variety 
of asymmetrical tactics, deemed lawfare, to disrupt the operational 
capabilities of, and gain tactical advantage against, a State committed 
to upholding the precepts of international law. 
Such conceptions of lawfare, however, cannot be exclusively 
attributed to non-state actors. Dunlap, along with many others, has 
acknowledged that many states engage with international law through 
such means as to constitute lawfare.43 He provides examples that 
include the US purchase of selected satellite imagery prior to the 
commencement of military operations in Afghanistan, the imposition 
of sanctions against Iraq to prevent the purchase of aircrafts or 
materials necessary for the maintenance of their existing fleet, efforts 
to enhance the rule of law as a strategic objective of 
counterinsurgency operations, and the use of legal means to 
confiscate financial assets from terrorist groups and their funders.44 
The use of international law, employed by state actors, however, 
goes well beyond these identified examples of strategic legal 
engagements. It manifests through instances in which international 
law is employed by States for similar purposes to those that prevalent 
uses of the lawfare label commonly accuse the United States’ 
“adversaries” of undertaking. Of relevance to the Council on Foreign 
Relation’s assertion that lawfare constitutes efforts to claim that US 
wars represent legal violations, David Kennedy notes:  
But if law can increase friction by persuading relevant audiences 
of a campaign’s illegitimacy, it can also grease the wheels of 
combat. Law is a strategic partner for military commanders when 
it increases the perception of outsiders that what the military is 
doing is legitimate.45 
                                                                                                                                     
43. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7; see also Scheffer, supra note 12. 
44. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, at 123-24. 
45. DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 41 (2006).  
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Furthermore, claims that lawfare is demonstrative of the increasingly 
prohibitive application of international humanitarian law seeks to 
assign pejorative implications to what is purely a debate concerning 
the purpose or necessity of law and legal regulation within a 
particular context. Since the mid-twentieth century, when the Geneva 
Conventions opened for ratification, they have been subject to 
interpretative disagreement.46 Yoram Dinstein explains that 
international humanitarian law is predicated on an equilibrium 
between opposing impulses – military necessity and humanitarian 
considerations.47 This naturally facilitates interpretive discord: 
“[B]etween military commanders and humanitarian workers, there 
might be a different understanding of that which constitutes 
acceptable collateral damage, simply because their respective 
interpretations of the principle of proportionality are taken from 
different standpoints.”48 
The suggestion that the source of such disagreement concerning 
the applicability or necessity of legal regulation constitutes a notion of 
lawfare seeks to delegitimize a particular interpretation of 
international humanitarian law. It preferences the interpretation of the 
military commander, while denouncing, or assigning pejorative 
implications to, a humanitarian-focused reading of the law that 
becomes the form of legal engagement employed by the weak, 
employed by the adversary. 
Furthermore, the described forms of legal engagement and 
denouncement that hold lawfare to have become a tactic employed by 
non-state actors against US interests and commitments to 
international law are scarcely limited to this context. Neither are they 
the sole manifestations of the asymmetrical wars fought in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Human shields, often presented as a lawfare method in 
which opponents of a State committed to international law manipulate 
this commitment to gain an operational or moral advantage, are 
consistently discussed as tactics employed by US adversaries in the 
War on Terror.49 The use of human shields for tactical purposes, 
                                                                                                                                     
46. Jamie A. Williamson, The Knight’s Code, Not His Lance, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 447, 447-48 (2010).  
47. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 16 (2004).  
48. Williamson, supra note 46, at 448.  
49. See, e.g., Robert Gates, Sec’y of Defense, & Michael Mullen, Joint Chief of Staff, 
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen on U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Press Conference from the 
Pentagon (May 12, 2009), available at http://iipdigital. usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/20
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however, has been observed in such early military encounters as the 
American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War.50 The British 
Manual of Military Law, issued at the start of the First World War, 
denounced the practice, as did the Commentaries to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.51 Nevertheless, human shields have been employed 
within many of the conflicts that have occurred throughout the 
twentieth century.52 
Similar discourses as those observed in relation to the use of 
human shields against US interests and by sub-state armed groups 
have featured prominently in numerous conflict situations. These 
include Israel’s official response to the international condemnation 
that followed its military operations within the Gaza Strip in 2014.53 
Russian forces commonly accused Chechen fighters of tactically 
employing human shields during the bombardment of Grozny in the 
late 1990s, and Pakistani Security Forces made similar claims during 
the siege of Lal Masjid in Islamabad.54 Commonly, these claims hold 
that the employment of such tactics by non-state actors demonstrate 
not simply a violation of international law, but instead the 
manipulation of international law. This infers, often directly, that state 
actors, otherwise committed to upholding the various provisions of 
international humanitarian law within situations of international or 
non-international armed conflict, are placed in a manufactured 
environment in which compliance with international law is 
compromised. It serves to delineate two forms of international law – 
                                                                                                                                     
09/05/20090512113947eaifas0.118664.html#axzz4ErRG1lTZ (describing how the Taliban 
provokes and exploits civilian casualties); see also Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, 
supra note 8; Dunlap Today and Tomorrow, supra note 5, at 315; Jensen, supra note 40, at 
269-70; Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12, at 326. 
50. Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 292, 293 (2009).  
51. Id. at 293-94.  
52. Id. at 294-96.  
53. See, e.g., Behind the Headlines: Fighting Hamas terrorism within the law, ISR. 
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (Aug. 7, 2014), http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Issues/
Pages/Fighting-Hamas-terrorism-within-the-law.aspx; see also Hamas’ Use of Human Shields 
is a War Crime, ISR. DEF. FORCES (July 14, 2014), https://www.idfblog.com/blog/
2014/07/14/hamas-use-human-shields-war-crime/; Captured Hamas Manuel Explains Benefit 
of Human Shields, ISR. DEF. FORCES (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.idfblog.com/blog/
2014/08/04/captured-hamas-combat-manual-explains-benefits-human-shields/>.  
54. Chechens ‘using human shields’, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 1999, 7:37 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/545672.stm; see also Pakistan’s Red Mosque Showdown: 
Jihadists Using Girls as Human Shields?, SPIEGEL ONLINE (July 5, 2007), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/pakistan-s-red-mosque-showdown-jihadists-using-
girls-as-human-shields-a-492545.html>.  
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legitimate and illegitimate – that are employed by the state and non-
state actor respectively. 
From such origins, the notion of lawfare presented by Dunlap, 
evolved from its particular application to instances of traditional and 
asymmetric armed conflict and was increasingly viewed as a threat to 
US interests in a post-September 11th internationalized landscape. 
With newfound prominence, lawfare came to describe a host of 
international legal engagements. Its popularized usages would 
maintain a pejorative slant and would present a deep skepticism 
concerning the role and utility of international law within this 
environment. Denunciations of international law, however, were not 
absolute and instead focused specifically on the use of international 
law by non-state actors. 
3. “OUR STRENGTH AS A NATION WILL CONTINUE TO BE 
CHALLENGED BY THOSE WHO EMPLOY A STRATEGY OF THE 
WEAK USING INTERNATIONAL FORA, JUDICIAL PROCESSES, 
AND TERRORISM.” 
— United States of America, 2005 National Defense Strategy55 
 
That the National Defense Strategy of the United States equated 
recourse to international law with acts of terrorism demonstrates the 
extent to which particular forms of legal engagement were viewed as 
a threat to US interests. Jack Goldsmith, an international lawyer and 
scholar, who served as the head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the 
Bush Administration, recalls the extent of this concern: “[Secretary of 
Defense] Rumsfeld had already been worrying about this problem 
under the rubric of ‘lawfare’, an idea that had been discussed in the 
Pentagon for years.”56 Within the White House, the Department of 
Justice, and the Pentagon, lawfare provided an all-encompassing term 
to describe the means by which the United States’ foes engaged with 
international law to shame and attempt to weaken US efforts within 
the War on Terror and the broad security apparatus that developed in 
the wake of the September 11th attacks. Goldsmith explained this 
emergent notion of lawfare: 
                                                                                                                                     
55. DEP’T DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 5 (2005), http://archive.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf.  
56. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 58 (2007).  
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Enemies like Al Qaeda who cannot match the United States 
militarily instead criticize it for purported legal violations, 
especially violations of human rights or the laws of war. They 
hide in mosques so that they can decry U.S. destruction of 
religious objects when attacked. They describe civilian deaths as 
“war crimes” even when the deaths are legally permissible 
“collateral damage” or they complain falsely that they were 
tortured . . . . Lawfare works because it manipulates something 
Americans value: respect for law.57 
Yet the perceived threat of lawfare was not simply viewed as a tactic 
undertaken by non-state actors like al-Qaeda or the Taliban, with 
whom the United States was engaged in asymmetrical war. Secretary 
Rumsfeld and the Pentagon viewed lawfare as constituting an 
unwarranted, but potentially influential, check on US military power. 
The expressed commitment of the United States’ traditional allies in 
Europe and South America to human rights regimes caused Rumsfeld 
to believe “that opponents incapable of checking American military 
power would increasingly rely on lawfare weapons instead.”58 A 
Department of Defense memorandum, authored by Secretary 
Rumsfeld, articulated the extent of the threat posed by such a notion 
of lawfare: 
In the past quarter century, various nations, NGOs, academics, 
international organizations, and others in the “international 
community” have been busily weaving a web  of 
international laws and judicial institutions that today threatens 
[US Government] interests . . . . Unless we tackle the problem 
head-on, it will continue to grow. The issue is especially urgent 
because of the unusual challenges we face in the war on 
terrorism.59 
Despite its broad usage, within a variety of contexts and by various 
actors, lawfare gained much of its political currency and popular 
practice amid the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 
emergent national security response to the terrorist attacks in New 
York and Washington, D.C.60 Increasingly, law-based criticisms (both 
                                                                                                                                     
57. Id. at 58-59.  
58. Id. at 59.  
59. Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., on Judicialization of 
International Politics to Vice President et al. (Apr. 9, 2003), http://library.rumsfeld.com/
doclib/sp/221/2003-04-09%20to%20Vice%20President%20et%20al%20re
%20Judicialization%20of%20International%20Politics.pdf. 
60. Horton, supra note 22, at 167. 
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international and municipal) of US actions and policies were met with 
accusations of lawfare. This popularized notion of lawfare had shifted 
considerably from Dunlap’s professed neutrality.61 It developed a 
broad reach that extended well beyond the term’s initial conception as 
a means of legal engagement focused on the achievement of a 
traditional military objective.62 This emergent reactive notion of 
lawfare was firmly embedded within neoconservative doctrine, an 
extension of an entrenched skepticism that viewed international law 
as a cumbersome and ultimately ineffective means of addressing 
national and global security challenges.63 
Many within the Bush Administration viewed this scant 
understanding of international law as an avoidable constraint on 
efforts to expand the boundaries of executive power and as 
constituting an affront to US sovereignty.64 Yet despite their 
ideological disdain and the professed ineffectiveness of international 
law, neoconservatives, paradoxically, view particular forms of legal 
engagement as a direct (and potentially effective) threat to the United 
States’ domestic and foreign interests.65 Various conservative 
commentators and ideological allies echoed the Administration’s 
cautions concerning the threat posed by international law.66 They held 
that “the most significant common thread among all these actions is 
the clear desire to portray U.S. government actions as illegal and 
unprecedented” and that “international law constitutes a real and 
immediate threat to U.S. national interest.”67 
                                                                                                                                     
61. Dunlap himself, in a later paper, noted this ideological shift and asserted that “despite 
the lawfare’s [sic] frequent negative characterization as a tool of terrorists, it is vital to 
remember that it is not restricted to one side of a conflict.” See Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, 
at 123-24. 
62. In relation to this development, Dunlap held that “lawfare was never meant to 
describe every possible relation between law and warfare. It focuses principally on 
circumstances where law can create the same or similar effects as those ordinarily sought from 
conventional warmaking approaches.” See id. at 122. 
63. Francis Fukuyama, After Neoconservatism, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 19, 2006), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/magazine/after-neoconservatism.html. 
64. Ohlin, supra note 3, at 8-9; see also Horton, supra note 22, at 167-68. 
65. See generally JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (2005). 
66. See, e.g., John Fonte, Democracy’s Trojan Horse, NAT’L INT. (2004), 
http://nationalinterest.org/article/democracys-trojan-horse-1155; Clare Lopez, SEALs Case 
Shows How Terrorists Use ‘Lawfare’ to Undermine U.S., HUM. EVENTS (Mar. 8, 2010), 
http://humanevents.com/2010/03/08/seals-case-shows-how-terrorists-use-lawfare-to-
undermine-us/; David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Rocky Shoals of International Law, 
62 NAT’L INT. 35 (2000-2001) [hereinafter Rocky Shoals]; Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12. 
67. Rivkin & Casey, supra note 21; Rocky Shoals, supra note 66, at 35. 
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Though this strayed considerably from Dunlap’s more limited 
iteration of lawfare, it came to represent the term’s prevalent, 
politicized application.68 Opponents of lawfare’s current 
manifestation and ideological grounding often (though not 
exclusively) hold that, however defined, “lawfare is a potentially 
powerful term that reflects the importance of law in the conflicts of 
the twenty-first century.”69 Still, its most ardent critics argue that the 
accusation or labelling of lawfare, popularly understood, facilitates 
the critique and silencing of human rights advocacy, verges towards 
propaganda, and ultimately discredits the intended function of 
international law.70 
Sadat and Geng, continuing their argument that lawfare’s 
common use serves to attack and dismantle legal norms, assert that 
the use of the term lawfare “poses a frontal challenge to our 
constitutional system, as well as the specific rules of war, 
international human rights law, and the international legal system, and 
even U.S. Constitutional rights, such as the right to habeas corpus.” 
Opponents who view lawfare within this context, as attempting to 
silence or delegitimize international law-based criticisms of state 
actors, place the use of lawfare within a culture of international legal 
neglect and unchecked impunity. This understanding and rejection of 
such uses of lawfare often accompanies the view that the Bush 
Administration and neoconservative ideology express general 
hostility towards international law, that it dismisses its dictates.71 
But framing lawfare, generally, as an attack on international law 
or as an attempt to dismantle legal norms perpetuates an overtly 
utopian view of international law. It reduces understandings of 
                                                                                                                                     
68. The Cleveland Experts Meeting discussed whether the term lawfare had been 
hijacked by neoconservative interests and debated how best to respond to this. While there 
appeared broad consensus that the term had been manipulated along ideological lines, there 
was no broad agreement about how to best respond. Several participants expressed that “now 
that others have widely propagated an alternative definition of the term, the academy has lost 
the initiative and would be fighting a futile cause in trying to recapture the concept as a neutral 
term.”  See Scharf & Anderson, supra note 8, at 12-13. 
69. This did not discount the view that “lawfare may not be a particularly useful term 
and may serve simply as an invented phenomenon useful only to anti-international 
humanitarian law hijackers as a tool of intimidation.”  Id. at 13, 15. 
70. See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 20, at 88-89. 
71. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Crying War, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BRIDGING THEORY AND PRACTICE 93, 100 (Thomas J. 
Biersteker et al. eds., 2007). See generally JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION’S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE “WAR” ON TERROR (2007); Ohlin, supra 
note 3. 
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international law to binary conceptions of conformity/violation, and 
fails to recognize the myriad forms of legal engagement that occur 
under the broad rubric of international law.72 The Bush 
Administration and its neoconservative allies, so often the recipients 
of allegations of international legal maleficence, nevertheless engaged 
consistently with international legal arguments.73 Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s Department of Defense memorandum, which warned of 
the international community’s efforts to use international law to 
threaten US interests, continued to provide a host of potential 
responses to what was perceived as the judicialization of international 
politics.74 These themselves drew heavily upon international law. 
They called for the formulation of legal arguments under the laws of 
armed conflict and belligerent occupation to justify a US presence and 
the use of force within and against Iraq. In attempting to delegitimize 
the International Criminal Court, Secretary Rumsfeld’s prescriptions 
sought to strengthen and expand bilateral frameworks through Article 
98 agreements to protect US officials from prosecution at the Court 
and proposed the enactment of legislation that would effectively 
sanction nations that pursue charges against US officials.75 
Such forms of legal engagement by the Bush Administration do 
not imply fidelity with international law or dismiss claims grounded 
within law that undertaken actions or policies by the Administration 
served to violate US legal commitments or international legal norms. 
Instead, this is intended to illustrate the folly of viewing lawfare 
                                                                                                                                     
72. See generally EYAL WEIZMAN, THE LEAST OF ALL POSSIBLE EVILS: 
HUMANITARIAN VIOLENCE FROM ARENDT TO GAZA (2011); Kennedy, supra note 45. 
73. For an account of the Bush Administration’s legal argumentation in relation to many 
of its most controversial practices, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Bush Administration and 
International Law: Too Much Lawyering and Too Little Diplomacy, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 57, 68 (2009). For an overall account of the role assumed by international law 
within successive US administrations and within the State Department, see MICHAEL P. 
SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER (2010). 
74. Memorandum from the U.S. Sec’y of Defense, supra note 59.   
75. Article 98 agreements reference Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute which holds, inter 
alia, that the ICC may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the 
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under an existing international 
agreement. On this basis, the United States has signed over one hundred bilateral immunity 
agreements with individual countries to ensure they do not surrender any American to the 
Court’s jurisdiction. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 98(2), July 17, 
1998, 183 U.N.T.S. 9; see also David J.R. Frakt, Lawfare and Counterlawfare: The 
Demonization of the Gitmo Bar and Other Legal Strategies in the War on Terror, 43 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 335, 352 (2010); Memorandum from the U.S. Sec’y of Defense, supra note 
59. 
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through such a generalized lens – as a broad assault on the discipline 
of international law. What is often described, critically, as lawfare is 
not a total or ontological challenge to international law, but is instead 
a denouncement of particular groups of law’s users. It is therefore 
more prudent to understand lawfare not as a general dismissal of 
international law, but instead as a particular affront to international 
law. This affront seeks to limit the access of particular groups and 
individuals to international recourse and delegitimize the means and 
methods through which such recourse may be pursued. 
4. “LAST YEAR THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
(ACLU) AND THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE LAWYERS (NACDL) ESTABLISHED THE JOHN ADAMS 
PROJECT TO ‘SUPPORT MILITARY COUNSEL AT 
GUANTANAMO BAY.’ THE MISSION BEHIND THIS 
TREACHEROUS ENTERPRISE WAS TO IDENTIFY 
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS INVOLVED IN INTERROGATING 
GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES AND THEN PROVIDE THAT 
INFORMATION TO MILITARY DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 
REPRESENTING DETAINEES SO THAT THEY COULD ATTEMPT 
TO CALL INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL TO TESTIFY.” 
— Florida Congressman Jeff Miller (R)76 
Lawfare came to describe the efforts of lawyers and 
organizations attempting to challenge the bestowed legal status and 
detention of foreign nationals held in the US Naval base at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The foreign national detention program, 
initiated by the Bush Administration in 2002, became a notorious 
symbol of the US-led War on Terror. The location, and uncertain 
legal status of the detainees, constituted a deliberate strategy to place 
these individuals beyond the jurisdiction of US courts.77 This initially 
served to create a legal gray area, where detainees were denied 
habeas corpus protections under the US Constitution and effectively 
                                                                                                                                     
76. Jeff Miller, Guest Blogger: Congressman Jeff Miller (R-FL) On Investigating the 
John Adams Project, DAILY SIGNAL (May 21, 2010), http://dailysignal.com/2010/05/21/guest-
blogger-congressman-jeff-miller-r-fl-on-investigating-the-john-adams-project/. 
77. Fiona de Londras, Guantanamo Bay: Towards Legality?, 71 MOD. L. REV. 36, 36-37 
(2008); Frakt, supra note 75, at 347 (recalling how alternative locations, like Andersen Air 
Force Base in Guam, were rejected due to the possibility that detainees held there may gain 
access to US Courts). 
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insulated from legal challenges that would contest the grounds of their 
detention.78 
The Administration’s strategy evoked a torrent of criticism that 
drew upon domestic constitutional law and a human rights-based 
framework.79 Foreign States, alongside regional and international 
organizations, joined the mounting chorus of condemnation.80 The 
European Parliament called on the United States to “close the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility and insist[] that every prisoner 
should be treated in accordance with international humanitarian law 
and tried without delay in a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent, impartial tribunal.”81 
Within the United States, the Bush-era detention program faced 
mounting domestic legal challenges.82 A series of petitions, 
coordinated through the Center for Constitutional Rights, brought 
                                                                                                                                     
78. John Yoo, a former lawyer in the Office of Legal Counsel and architect of much of 
the Administration’s legal framework concerning many of the most controversial aspects of 
the war on terror, confirmed this intention. See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN 
INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 142-46 (2006). 
79. The US section of Amnesty International have been amongst the most high-profile 
critics of the Guantánamo Bay detention program, holding that “[f]rom day one, the USA 
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Amnesty Int’l, Guantanamo, A Decade of Damage to Human Rights, AI Index No. AMR 
51/103/2011 (2011). Numerous other human rights-focused NGOs expressed similar, rights-
based, condemnations of the detention program. See e.g., Locked Up Alone: Detention 
Conditions and Mental Health at Guantanamo, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 9, 2008), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/locked-alone/detention-conditions-and-mental-health-
guantanamo. 
80. See, e.g., Merkel: Guantanamo Mustn’t Exist in Long Term, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Jan. 9 
2006, 9:58 AM),  http://www.spiegel.de/international/20uantan-interview-merkel-guantanamo-
mustn-t-exist-in-long-term-a-394180.html (comments of German Chancellor Angela Merkel); 
Blair: Guantanamo is an anomaly, GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2006, 7:38 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/feb/17/politics.guantanamo (comments of former 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair); see also UK told US won’t shut Guantanamo, BBC NEWS 
(May 11, 2006, 2:55 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4760365.stm. 
81.  Resolution on Guantanamo, EUR. PARL. DOC. B6-0299/2006 (May 23, 2006);  see 
also Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n on H.R., Inter-American Commission Urges United 
States to Close Guantanamo Without Delay, Resolution No. 1/06 (July 28, 2006); Juan E. 
Mendez (Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of 
punishment),  Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture at the Expert 
Meeting on the situation of detainees held at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay (Oct. 3, 
2013), delivered by Ms. Stephanie Selg, Associate Human Rights Expert, Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13859&. 
82. See generally Meredith B. Osborn, Rasul v. Bush: Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction 
over Habeas Challenges and Other Claims Brought by Guantanamo Detainees, 40 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 265 (2005); de Londras, supra note 77. 
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numerous writs of habeas corpus on behalf of various detainees. The 
representation provided by these lawyers, dubbed the Guantánamo 
Bay Bar, in bringing forth habeas petitions attracted instant 
controversy and would be viewed as an example of an expansive 
notion of lawfare.83 
Several commentators perceived the actions of these lawyers, 
and the intentions of their clients, as treacherous and equated the legal 
motions with national security threats: 
Lawyers can literally get us killed . . . . We may never know how 
many of the hundreds of repatriated detainees are back in action, 
fighting the U.S. or our allies thanks to the efforts of the 
Guantanamo Bay Bar . . . . Allowing lawyers to subvert the truth 
and transform the Constitution into a lethal weapon in the hands 
of our enemies – while casting themselves as patriots – makes 
mockery of the sacrifices made by true patriots . . . .84 
Others assumed a critical but more measured response to the assigned 
intentions of the lawyers and the habeas petitions. While these did not 
reach the levels of hysteria displayed by some commentators, they 
served to provide an expansive understanding of how lawfare was 
understood:  
Most instances of lawfare, such as the more than 400 habeas 
corpus lawsuits filed by detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, simply seek to harass and burden our legal mechanisms. 
Like a computer virus or a hacker’s denial-of-service attack on a 
network, meritless suits seek to grind the wheels of justice to a 
halt.85 
This emergent notion of lawfare moved well beyond Dunlap’s 
conception of law as a substitute for a traditional military means to 
achieve an operational objective.86 As David Frakt, a former Defense 
Counsel with the Office of Military Commissions, asks of this 
imposed notion of lawfare: “[W]hat exactly are the military ends 
                                                                                                                                     
83. For an overview of the associated controversy, see Frakt, supra note 75, at 336-40. 
See also Scott Horton, Silencing the Lawyers, HARPER’S MAG. (May 26, 2010, 10:23 AM), 
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84. Daniel Halper, Lawfare Warning, WKLY. STANDARD (Mar. 5, 2010), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/lawfare-warnings/article/422507, quoted in Frakt, supra note 
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85. C. Peter Dungan, Fighting Lawfare: At the Special Operations Task Force Level, 21 
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86. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, at 122. 
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pursued by [this] lawfare? What is it that a military enemy is 
theoretically trying to accomplish through manipulative legal 
actions?”87 
Yet when the Supreme Court of the United States held District 
Courts had jurisdiction to hear the habeas petitions and, later, that the 
Guantánamo detainees were entitled to protection under the US 
Constitution, accusations of lawfare were accompanied by firm policy 
prescriptions that served to further obfuscate the detainees’ access to 
judicial remedies and the ability of their lawyers to bring forth such 
petitions.88 This emergent notion of lawfare, described in a 
Washington Post op-ed as the use of federal courts to undermine the 
military’s ability to keep dangerous enemy combatants off the 
battlefield, evoked a range of official responses.89 
From the time that the Bush Administration initiated the transfer 
of foreign detainees to Guantánamo Bay, efforts were taken to limit 
their access to both courts and lawyers.90 Initially, many of the 
detainees were held incommunicado and had their identities 
concealed.91 In direct response to the early Supreme Court decisions 
in Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,92 which extended habeas 
protections to the detainees, the US Congress passed the 2005 
Detainee Treatment Act, which, inter alia, held that:  
[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or 
consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or 
on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.93  
Following the Hamdi decision, in which the Court held the detainees 
are entitled to some level of due process, the Government established 
Combat Status Review Tribunals.94 These, however, were designed to 
deny detainees legal representation and prohibited the lawyers who 
                                                                                                                                     
87. Frakt, supra note 75, at 341. 
88. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723 (2008). 
89. Marc A. Thiessen, The ‘al-Qaeda seven’ and selective McCarthyism, WASH. POST, 
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90. See generally David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1981, 1987-98 (2008) [hereinafter Luban Lawfare]. 
91. Id. at 1989. 
92. See generally Rasul, 542 U.S. 466; Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507.   
93. Detainee Treatment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2005). 
94. See generally Robert A. Peal, Combat Status Review Tribunals and the Unique 
Nature of the War on Terror, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1629 (2005). 
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represented these clients in federal court from discussing the Review 
Tribunal procedure.95 
When defense counsel formally gained increased access 
following the Supreme Court decisions in 2004, they faced numerous 
practical obstacles in accessing their clients. Guantánamo’s location, 
limiting travel logistics, federal oversight of lawyer-client 
communications, and the classified status of such information all 
contributed to a climate in which “the mechanics of meeting with 
[their] clients comprise[d] one important set of policies that [made] 
these representations unusually difficult.”96 These factors were 
compounded by several other intentional efforts that sought to deny 
the detainees’ access to their lawyers and endeavored to compromise 
the lawyers’ abilities to conduct their defense effectively. Deliberate 
efforts were taken to ensure that the detainees were unable or 
unwilling to meet with their lawyers:  
They don’t tell the detainee that his lawyer is there to see him. 
Instead, they tell him that he “has a reservation,” which means an 
interrogation. The detainee says he doesn’t want to go, so then 
they tell the lawyer that his client doesn’t want to see him.97 
Numerous other methods were deliberately employed to strain the 
client-lawyer relationship. Detainees were told of their lawyer’s 
sexual orientation, cultural or religious heritage, or given examples of 
their past clients. The detainees were told that their lawyer was gay, 
Jewish, or once represented the State of Israel (whether or not these 
claims were factual), and were encouraged by Guantánamo 
interrogators not to trust their lawyers as a result.98 
Beyond the restrictive environment manufactured in 
Guantánamo, Jeff Miller, the Congressman from Florida who equated 
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’ (“NACDL”) efforts to 
support habeas petitions for several of the Guantánamo detainees 
with an act of treachery, compelled the Defense Department’s 
Inspector General to investigate the “conduct and practice” of lawyers 
                                                                                                                                     
95. Luban Lawfare, supra note 90, at 1987; see also JOSEPH MARGULIES, 
GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 159-70 (2006). 
96. Luban Lawfare, supra note 90, at 1989-90. 
97. Id. at 1990. 
98. Id. at 1992-98. 
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who represented clients at Guantánamo.99 Government officials 
publicly shamed the defense attorneys as a professional class and 
implicitly threatened the business interests of the firms where they 
were employed.100 David Frakt asserted that “[t]he Bush 
Administration took their counterlawfare efforts to the extreme by 
denying detainees all access to lawyers or to courts, and by asserting 
that no laws or treaties, including Article 3 [of the Geneva 
Conventions], protected detainees . . . .”101 
Again, though, this was not a blanket rejection of international 
law or an assertion that the exigency of the post-September 11th 
landscape compelled derogation from relevant legal frameworks. 
Instead, in establishing its response to this expansive notion of 
lawfare, the Administration presented intricate legal arguments that 
drew directly on interpreted notions of international law. The Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatments of Prisoners of War (The 
Third Geneva Convention) was held, based on a formulistic reading 
of the Convention’s provisions, to apply only to High Contracting 
Parties “which can only be states.”102 In following: “[N]one of the 
provisions of [the Third Geneva Convention] apply to our conflict 
with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world.”103 
Common Article 3 of the Conventions, which provides 
protection to combatants captured during battle in instances of non-
international armed conflict, was declared inapplicable due to the 
international status of the US military campaigns in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.104 The Office of Legal Counsel and the State Department 
debated the application of this body of law to the detainees, each 
                                                                                                                                     
99. This was required through a provision in a Defense Appropriations Act and 
compelled formal investigation when defense lawyers were believed to have “interfered with 
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100. Gregory P. Noone, Lawfare or Strategic Communications, 43 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 73, 77 (2010); see also Top Pentagon Officials Calls for Boycott of Law Firms 
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Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees to Vice President et al. (Feb. 7 2002), 
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf. 
103. Id. 
104. Id.; see Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
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putting forth international law-based arguments detailing how the 
President was required to act in response to the threat of terrorism.105 
These legal engagements, along with various legislative and policy 
initiatives taken by both the Administration and Congress, contrived 
to ensure that, until definitive Supreme Court intervention nearly 
seven years after Guantánamo Bay received its first detainees in the 
War on Terror, habeas petitions were severely limited.106 
Contested conceptions and interpretations of international law 
were at the core of the debate and controversy that surrounded the 
detention program at Guantánamo Bay. The policies and legislative 
framework that created the detention facility drew upon 
interpretations of international law.107 These arguments failed to 
convince many beyond the Administration and its staunchest allies. 
The Supreme Court denounced many of the Government’s policies 
and supporting legal arguments.108 Yet, the efforts taken by the 
detainees themselves, by individual lawyers who offered their 
representation, and by private organizations who coordinated or 
supported these efforts merited the charge of lawfare. In response to 
this expansive understanding of lawfare, the Administration and 
Congress increased its efforts to further deny the Guantánamo 
detainees, the vast majority of whom were never charged, access to 
courts and access to legal representations.109 Again, lawfare did not 
equate to a broad denouncement of international law, but instead to a 
particular and systematic effort to limit the use of international law 
and legal remedies by a particular actor, for a particular purpose. 
                                                                                                                                     
105. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., on Application of 
Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees to William J Haynes II, Gen. Couns. 
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Memorandum from William H. Taft, Dep’t of State, on Your Draft Memorandum of January 9 
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debates between the Office of Legal Counsel and the State Department, see Bradley, supra 
note 73, at 66-67. 
106. See Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723 (2008). 
107. See Bradley, supra note 73, at 62-67. 
108.  See supra note 88.  
109. Of the 779 individuals detained at Guantánamo, 674 were released without any 
charge and others await release. See Guantanamo: Facts and Figures, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2016/04/18/guantanamo-facts-
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5. “AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TRIAL, ONCE MORE THE 
BROTHERS MUST INSIST ON PROVING THAT TORTURE WAS 
INFLICTED ON THEM BY STATE SECURITY [INVESTIGATORS] 
BEFORE THE JUDGE.” 
— al-Qaeda Training Manual (The Manchester Manual)110 
 
The controversy that surrounded the detainees contributed 
towards another understanding of lawfare that carried beyond the 
boundaries of the US Naval base at Guantánamo Bay. This use of the 
term lawfare is of multifaceted purpose. It claims that accusations of 
torture or mistreatment by, or on behalf of, detainees constitute either 
a strategic effort to burden tactical operations within zones of combat 
or seek to shame the United States’ international reputation and 
generate public disapproval of its foreign policy. 
The first accused motive holds that, “[r]ecently, insurgent forces 
in Iraq and Afghanistan have been waging a legal battle against 
tactical-level forces to extend the lines of operation of their leaders’ 
lawfare efforts and to attempt to blunt America’s tip of the spear.”111 
This understanding of lawfare, which manifests simply through the 
accusation of torture, abuse, or other forms of mistreatment, 
constitutes a strategic attempt to compromise the operational 
objectives of the state against whom the accusation is made: 
[D]etainees may make claims of abuse at the point of capture by 
indigenous forces, claim abuse again when transferred to an 
American detachment or team, and then claim abuse once again 
when they reach the detention facility . . . . Knowing that U.S. 
forces are duty-bound to investigate all claims of detainee abuse, 
insurgents can effectively burden leaders at three different levels 
of tactical command with detailed investigations.112 
Additionally, this notion of lawfare argues that claims of torture 
constitute a significant public relations victory for the United States’ 
enemies: 
By latching onto the torture narrative through the confirmed 
instances of mistreatment, and further taking this narrative onto 
the record in various legal forums, the tactic served to irreparably 
                                                                                                                                     
110.  Al Qaeda Manual, Part 21, U.S. BORDER PATROL, 
http://www.usborderpatrol.com/Border_Patrol1803_21.htm (alteration in original). 
111. Dungan, supra note 85, at 10. 
112. Id. 
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harm the image of the United States, removed the benefit of the 
doubt pertaining to government efforts to combat torture 
allegations, and consequentially the government’s ability to 
effectively prosecute both a war and its accused war criminals.113 
Commentators who perpetuate this notion of lawfare have suggested 
that detainees of the War on Terror intentionally provoke US officials 
so as to “force” mistreatment and substantiate a claim of abuse.114 
That these detainees (often, accused members of al-Qaeda or the 
Taliban) would manufacture an accusation of torture or abuse to gain 
a tangible advantage over their captors is described as “akin to 
malicious prosecution.”115 This understanding of lawfare, however, 
extends beyond the individual detainee who claims torture or abuse. 
Both non-governmental organizations and media outlets who 
have either reported or investigated accusations of torture have been 
charged with practicing this form of lawfare. Such groups and their 
representatives are believed to be forwarding an ideological agenda 
intent on damaging the United States’ reputation and curtailing its 
hegemonic design.116 Amnesty International has been accused of 
disseminating its literature to detainees held by US forces and 
essentially directing detainees to claim torture.117 This particular 
claim of lawfare moved beyond the accusation made by the detainee, 
often with little regard for the merits of the accusation, and fixated on 
the intermediary who sought to substantiate or disseminate the varied 
claims. 
NGOs and certain media outlets were declared as threats to US 
interests.118 Their actions were equated with terrorist organizations: 
“This new class of warrior consists of intergovernmental 
organizations, transnational guerrilla and terrorist groups, 
multinational organizations . . . and a rapidly growing number of 
nongovernmental organizations in a wide variety of functional 
                                                                                                                                     
113. Lebowitz, supra note 19, at 362. 
114. See Tung Yin, Boumediene and Lawfare, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 865, 880 (2009). 
115. Id. at 881. 
116. See Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12, at 319-20; see also Frakt, supra note 75, at 
342. 
117. See Lebowitz, supra note 19, at 374; see also Debra Burlingame & Thomas 
Joscelyn, Gitmo’s Indefensible Lawyers, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2010), 
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areas.”119 These charges, however, went beyond simple accusations 
and talking-points espoused by various commentators who – in 
accordance with Michael Kearney’s understanding of lawfare as a 
“critique of human rights activism and advocacy” – viewed the role 
assumed by NGOs and certain media outlets as detrimental to US 
interests within the War on Terror.120 
Donald Rumsfeld introduced this notion of lawfare into the 
official discourse that surrounded the detainees held in US custody. 
The Secretary of Defense claimed, “[t]hese detainees are trained to 
lie, they’re trained to say they were tortured, and the minute we 
release them or the minute they get a lawyer, very frequently they’ll 
go out and they will announce that they’ve been tortured . . . The 
media jumps on these claims.”121 Secretary Rumsfeld would 
substantiate such accusations with reference to an al-Qaeda training 
manual, discovered by the Manchester Metropolitan Police during a 
raid of a home in the North-East of England. Dubbed the Manchester 
Manual, Secretary Rumsfeld repeated the claim that terrorists have 
been trained to lie about abuse and torture while in US captivity 
because “their training manual says so.”122 
The Manchester Manual served as purportedly uncontroversial 
evidence that al-Qaeda practiced aggressive forms of lawfare, were 
familiar with and able to advantageously manipulate US and 
international law, and employed a standard operating procedure that 
manufactured false claims of abuse to both burden and denigrate US 
objectives and interests.123 David Frakt has claimed that the Bush 
                                                                                                                                     
119. Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12, at 303-04; see also Davida E. Kellogg, 
International Law and Terrorism, 85 MIL. REV. 50, 50 (2005) (“The opinions of 
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Administration used the existence of the Manual to convince the 
public of the legitimacy of its enhanced interrogation program. He 
cites a Department of Defense official who argued that the 
Manchester Manual demonstrated al-Qaeda’s ability to remain 
impervious to traditional interrogation techniques: “There is a very 
lengthy chapter on counter-interrogation techniques. These are 
sophisticated terrorists who know how to avoid interrogation.”124 
The Manual, described as both an act and evidence of lawfare, 
was used by US officials to formally defend the United States against 
international law-based accusations of torture and prisoner 
mistreatment, despite the fact that the Manual had been discovered in 
2000 – before the United States formally began its leadership role in 
the War on Terror.125 In response to questions posed by the United 
Nation’s Committee Against Torture to the US Government regarding 
allegations of abuse and torture, Charles Stimson, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, replied to the UN 
monitoring body: 
While the United States is aware of allegations of torture and ill-
treatment, and takes them very seriously, it disagrees strongly 
with the assertion that such are widespread or systematic . . . 
these allegations must be placed in context: they relate to a 
minute percentage of the overall number of persons who have 
been detained. Moreover, not everything that is alleged is in fact 
truth. For example, it is well-known that al Qaeda are trained to 
lie. The “Manchester Manual” instructs all al Qaeda members, 
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when captured, to allege torture, even if they are not subject to 
abuse.126 
The Administration’s position in the debate over interrogation 
techniques and accusations of torture and other forms of mistreatment 
did not, however, disassociate from international legal reasoning. The 
enhanced interrogation program that gave rise to many allegations of 
torture leveled against the United States was based largely upon 
particular readings and interpretations of international law. The 
notorious definition of torture that would form the basis of the 
enhanced interrogation programs operated by the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the Department of Defense was effectively a legal 
argument about the necessary standard of conduct that must be 
achieved so as to remain in compliance with the United Nation’s 
Convention Against Torture.127 The Bush Administration and the 
Department of Justice drew directly upon international law when they 
sought to devise the means and methods of interrogation that would 
provide their desired security and intelligence outcomes. These legal 
arguments were, of course, abject failures that were routinely 
denounced and almost universally held to have strayed disastrously 
from any plausible account of state obligation pertaining to the 
treatment of detainees or the prohibition on torture.128 Yet the merits 
of these arguments and legal engagements are not of direct concern, 
nor do they alter the fact that US officials attempted to draw directly 
upon international legal arguments to legitimize aspects of their 
interrogation tactics. 
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Individuals or organizations who claimed abuse or denounced 
these interrogation techniques and the treatment of detainees more 
broadly were accused of practicing lawfare. First, the accusation of 
lawfare would dismiss the substance of the claim, effectively (albeit 
informally) rendering the claim inadmissible due to the perceived and 
assigned motives of the individual or organization forwarding the 
claim. This allows the claim to be denied by accusing the claimant of 
lying as per the Manchester Manual. Second, it accuses third-party 
interests (often NGOs or international organizations) who make or 
publicize similar accusations of perpetuating a false claim. 
Collectively, this delegitimizes the use of international mechanisms 
and standards by such actors who seek to pursue or frame claims in 
accordance with international law. These particular forms of 
international legal engagement become an illegitimate and 
(informally) inadmissible means of achieving redress or demanding 
account. 
6. “SUCH LAWFARE – THE MANIPULATION OF WESTERN 
LAWS AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS TO ACHIEVE STRATEGIC 
MILITARY AND POLITICAL ENDS – OFTEN MANIFESTS AS 
FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS DESIGNED TO SILENCE, PUNISH, AND 
DETER THOSE WHO PUBLICLY SPEAK AND REPORT ON 
MILITANT ISLAM, TERRORISM AND THEIR SOURCES OF 
FINANCING.” 
— Brooke Goldstein and Benjamin Ryberg (of the Lawfare 
Project)129 
 
On the margins of the War on Terror, lawfare has come to 
describe the actions of individuals or organizations who employ libel 
or hate speech laws to “silence” criticism of “controversial Islamic 
organizations.”130 This marked a significant departure from Dunlap’s 
description of law as a substitute for traditional military means to 
achieve an operational objective.131 Opponents of this notion of 
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lawfare hold that, “over the past ten years, there has been a steady 
increase in Islamist lawfare tactics directly targeting the human rights 
of North American and European civilians in order to constrain the 
free flow of public information about radical Islam.”132 
This notion of lawfare is believed to create a chilling effect on 
individuals disseminating information about such groups.133 Alan 
Dershowitz and Elizabeth Samson have argued that “[radical Islamic 
groups] have learned to sue their critics for defamation, not with the 
intent to win the case, but with the hope of imposing an unaffordably 
high cost on criticism of their actions.”134 According to opponents of 
this notion of lawfare, it is “effective because one lawsuit can silence 
thousands who have neither the time nor the financial resources to 
challenge well-funded terror financiers or the vast machine of the 
international judicial system.”135 
Despite the apparent departure from Dunlap’s intended meaning 
of the term, this notion of lawfare has strained its application to 
include national security considerations. Brooke Goldstein and 
Benjamin Ryberg of The Lawfare Project argue that the significance 
of such lawfare tactics has adversely impacted how the US 
Government approaches national security reporting.136 This threat, 
according to Goldstein and Ryberg, has resulted from formal 
engagements with international legal mechanisms:  
For more than ten years, an international movement to silence 
free speech about Islamist terrorism has emerged from the United 
Nations under the guise of “prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of religion or belief” – with a marked focus on Islam.137 
Accordingly, this, coupled with the use of domestic courts to bring 
libel cases against groups or individuals who attempt to expose 
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“terrorism or terrorist financing,” carries detrimental effects on 
domestic policy and security initiatives.138 Domestically, this has 
manifested through a host of initiatives, largely undertaken by the 
Obama Administration, that Goldstein and Ryberg believe to 
evidence “how the Islamist lawfare strategy to politicize speech 
deemed ‘Islamophobic’, and to silence speech deemed blasphemous 
of Islam, is directly impacting U.S. domestic policy.”139 
While free speech receives broad formal protection under the 
First Amendment to the US Constitution, opponents of this form of 
purported lawfare draw upon the threat of “libel tourism.”140 This 
supposes that a plaintiff will “forum shop” to find a sympathetic and 
legally advantageous jurisdiction to bring forth a libel claim against a 
foreign defendant. Most often, the United Kingdom, known for 
plaintiff-friendly libel laws and a burden of proof standard under 
which the accused must prove his or her own innocence, is the 
preferred venue.141 While such methods and legal tactics have 
increasingly been discussed in relation to an expansive notion of 
lawfare, the use of libel tourism, forum shopping, and the vexatious 
employment of domestic laws to silence criticism have long histories 
of strategic application.142 Yet it has not been until particular groups – 
primarily Muslims or Islamic organizations – began, or were at least 
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perceived to begin, engaging with libel laws that the term lawfare was 
applied and legislative and judicial measures were taken in response. 
Following the 2003 publication of Funding Evil: How Terrorism 
is Financed and How to Stop It, a book in which author Rachel 
Ehrenfeld accused Khalid Salim Bin Mahfouz, a prominent Saudi 
banker, of providing financial support to al-Qaeda and other terrorist 
organizations, Bin Mahfouz filed a defamation claim in English 
court.143 After Ehrenfeld refused to acknowledge the English Court’s 
jurisdiction, Bin Mahfouz was awarded damages.144 Bin Mahfouz did 
not attempt to enforce the ruling in the United States; however, 
Rachel Ehrenfeld filed for a declaratory judgment, arguing that 
“under federal and New York law, bin Mahfouz could not prevail on 
the libel claim against her and that the English default judgement was 
invalid.”145 
The New York Court of Appeals declined jurisdiction on the 
matter but held that there was a need to protect New York residents 
from the chilling effect of foreign libel judgments but that such 
actions needed to result from state legislation.146 In direct response, 
lawmakers in Albany passed the Libel Terrorism Protection Act, 
dubbed “Rachel’s Law,” which “was designed to address the issue of 
obtaining personal jurisdiction over a plaintiff in a foreign defamation 
action, as well as the substantive issue of whether a New York Court 
would enforce a foreign judgment.”147 
The legislation focused on narrow jurisdictional issues and the 
compatibility of foreign judgments with afforded First Amendment 
protections. The accompanying discourse surrounding the drafting 
and passage of the legislation, however, fixated on issues of terrorism, 
terrorist financing, and the accompanying notion of lawfare.148 
Various States followed, passing similarly formed laws and the 
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following year federal legislation began moving through Congress.149 
While the resulting federal legislation sought to balance free speech 
protections with the principle of comity and did not directly mention 
issues of terrorism or lawfare, the legislation was largely driven by 
such influences.150 
Certainly, individuals or groups of litigants may attempt to 
advantageously or vexatiously apply libel laws, either within the 
United States or through foreign jurisdictions, but this is hardly an 
exclusive phenomenon attributable to a particular group. Yet, the 
identification of such legal actions, regardless of their respective 
merits, as lawfare, is reserved for what Alan Dershowitz and 
Elizabeth Samson dubbed “controversial Islamic organizations.”151 
The singular focus of this notion of lawfare, and the at least partially 
implied intentions of accompanying reactive legislation, serves to 
brand any legal action brought by an Islamic group or individual as 
malicious and devoid of legal merit often before or without the 
substance of the legal claim receiving judicial treatment. This, in 
itself, creates a chilling effect. From the moment of commencement, 
legal actions brought by a particular class, under the supposed guise 
of lawfare, are reactively doubted, limited, and repressed. 
7. “TRUTH BE TOLD, WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO EMBRACE 
LAWFARE, FOR IT IS VASTLY PREFERABLE TO THE BLOODY, 
EXPENSIVE, AND DESTRUCTIVE FORMS OF WARFARE THAT 
RAVAGED THE WORLD IN THE 20TH CENTURY…I WOULD FAR 
PREFER TO HAVE MOTIONS AND DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
FIRED AT ME THAN INCOMING MORTAR OR ROCKET-
PROPELLED GRENADE FIRE.” 
— Phillip Carter (former US Army Officer)152 
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Much of what was originally termed lawfare is clearly preferable 
to the high costs and tragic certainties of war. Charles Dunlap has 
acknowledged that “there are many uses of what might be called 
‘lawfare’ that serve to reduce the destructiveness of conflicts, and 
therefore further one of the fundamental purposes of the law of 
war.”153 In such instances, it is not immediately evident why these 
uses of international law do not simply represent an intended or 
successful function of international law. Though if Dunlap is correct 
that acts such as purchasing satellite imagery, imposing sanctions 
against Iraq’s Air Force, strengthening the rule of law, or ceasing the 
finance of terrorist organizations enabled the evasion of sustained 
episodes of violence then such forms of legal engagement are plainly 
preferable.154 
States, however, have long partaken in such forms of legal 
engagement. An increasingly globalized and formalist international 
environment, mature legal mechanisms, and developed civil society 
organizations may provide greater opportunities for engagement but 
such forms of strategic legal employment are well-established.155 The 
actions of a State or international actor that invokes international law 
in furtherance of a strategic objective do not frequently merit such 
general attention or a designated nomenclature. 
Despite the ubiquity of much of what Dunlap’s evolved 
conception of lawfare describes, the term has gained prominence 
within media and amongst policymakers. It is tempting to place the 
rise of lawfare within the context of a post-September 11th, War on 
Terror, Bush Administration-dominated environment. It is here that 
lawfare has its origins, developed its diverse understandings and 
applications, and received prominent attention from the highest levels 
of political power. But lawfare should not be understood within this 
singular context. An analysis of the use of the term lawfare over a ten-
year span found that while the term began appearing within the media 
in 2003, eighty-seven percent of total references to lawfare occurred 
between 2009 and 2013, when the study concluded.156 
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Still, the question remains: Do we have every reason to embrace 
a state-led notion of lawfare, as many commentators have 
suggested?157 Orde Kittrie argues that “the U.S. government’s lack of 
systematic engagement with lawfare is a tremendous missed 
opportunity” and that “lawfare, deployed systematically and adeptly, 
could in various circumstances save U.S. and foreign lives by 
enabling U.S. national security objectives to be advanced with less or 
no kinetic warfare.”158 
Again, it is evident that such uses of international law, while not 
necessarily novel, are to be welcomed. Kittrie, and many 
commentators engaged in the lawfare debate, however, understand 
law within this context to constitute a weapon of war. Dunlap, for 
instance, has argued that: 
[H]arking back to the original characterization of lawfare as 
simply another kind of weapon, one that is produced, 
metaphorically speaking, by beating law books into swords . . . a 
weapon can be used for good or bad purposes, depending upon 
the mindset of those who wield it. Much the same can be said 
about the law.159  
If one, however, envisions law as a weapon, as opposed to a strategic 
tool or some less incendiary analogy, it will facilitate efforts to 
brandish such a weapon in instances that its user perceives as a just 
cause. Congruently, however, this view of international law also 
facilitates an inverse understanding of law’s use by one’s opponent. 
Whether an enemy on the battlefield or an ideological challenger, law 
becomes a weaponized threat requiring a firm and decisive response. 
Considerations of whether we have every reason to embrace lawfare 
should be made within this context. Often, when a legal engagement 
is branded as lawfare, the response to this particular form of legal 
engagement begins to demonstrate what lawfare means. This is not a 
definitional question but instead one focused on the implications of 
applying the term lawfare to such forms of legal engagement – as an 
action, a form of speech, and as a label. 
As Neve Gordon demonstrates, the vast majority of literature 
dedicated to lawfare focuses on its definition and normative 
underpinnings.160 Instead, he holds that “lawfare is not merely used to 
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describe certain phenomena, but that it operates as a speech act that 
reconstitutes the human rights field as a national security threat.”161 
Gordon’s understanding of what lawfare does asks both the correct 
question and is well demonstrated through the Israeli case study that 
substantiates his work.162 It is now, however, prudent to ask what 
lawfare means – to both understandings and functions of international 
law – from a more holistic perspective. 
If we survey the literature and observe examples of how lawfare 
has been deployed and understood as both a description of a 
phenomenon and an act with normative implications varied examples 
emerge. The claim of torture, filing a habeas brief, and the use of a 
human shield are each held to constitute both an international legal 
engagement and an act of lawfare. Likewise, the imposition of 
sanctions against a foreign military or a defense lawyer, the signing of 
an Article 98 agreement to immunize a US official from ICC 
prosecution, or the confiscation of terrorist assets constitute both a 
legal engagement and a form of lawfare. 
The critical view of lawfare, that it popularly constitutes an 
attack on or dismantlement of legal norms, serves to endow 
international law with a singular, likely virtuous, purpose. It does not 
recognize that international law is commonly used for a diversity of 
reasons, any of which may evoke their own competing moral 
pronouncements or normative attributions. This recalls David 
Kennedy’s understanding of international law as “a set of arguments, 
rhetorical performances and counter-performances, deployed by 
people pursuing projects of various kinds.”163 Labeling certain legal 
engagements as lawfare serves to tip the balance of these pursuits. 
Its pejorative application – that is, its framing of international 
legal engagement as a weapon, as a threat – serves to delegitimize and 
ultimately disenfranchise particular forms of legal engagement. It is 
thus accurate to view, understand, and frame, this most common 
application of the term lawfare, not as a dismantlement of legal norms 
or as an attack on the human rights field (though it may do such 
things), but instead as a limitation on access to international justice. 
The concept of access to justice is well formed within many 
domestic jurisdictions. In comparison, however, its articulation within 
                                                                                                                                     
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 318-39.   
163. DAVID KENNEDY, LAWFARE AND WARFARE IN THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 158, 173 (James Crawford & Martti Koskinniemi eds., 2012). 
2016] WHAT DOES LAWFARE MEAN? 39 
international law, while drawing upon established concepts, is recent 
in its use.164 As international law’s focus developed from its early 
state-centric conception to include considerations of the individual 
actor, the notion of access to international justice began to form.165 
Individualized international justice secured its modern foundation 
through the drafting of the United Nations Charter and the 
establishment of the Nuremburg Tribunal.166 Article 2 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights holds that “[e]veryone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind . . . .”167 Continuing, the Declaration 
holds that every individual possesses a right to an effective remedy 
for any acts that violate their fundamental rights and that all are 
“entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of his rights 
and obligations . . . .”168 
These foundational principles, which gave license to individuals 
within international mechanisms, began the transformation of 
established domestic legal principles into international legal 
obligations.169 These received further grounding through the host of 
global developments occurring throughout the latter-half of the 
twentieth century. Adoption of the International Covenants on Civil 
and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
strengthened the legal effect of these provisions. The development of 
legally binding regional human rights treaties and accompanying 
enforcement mechanisms like the European Court of Human Rights 
further facilitated the ability of the individual to gain access to the 
promise of international justice and redress.170 
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Narrowly, access to international justice, like its domestic 
counterpart, can be understood as “the right to a judicial remedy 
before an independent court of law.”171 While it is not the purpose of 
this paper to trace the development of the concept of access to 
international justice, it is employed here in its broadest sense. This 
holds that under international law, respect for principles, provisions, 
and individual rights receive meaning and actualization through the 
ability of individuals to engage with them through formal and 
informal, state and non-state, systems or regimes. 
As commonly employed, the accusation of lawfare serves to 
justify interference, or attempted interference, with this ability. It does 
not represent an ontological challenge to international law. Those who 
scream lawfare loudest and denounce the role and influence of 
international law rarely (if ever) intend their denouncement to 
discount the totality of ways which international law can be engaged. 
Often, their response to lawfare draws upon international law, at least 
in part and not always convincingly. But equally, they are actors 
under international law who engage and apply it accordingly. 
The claim of lawfare, the perceived threat of international law 
that constitutes many of lawfare’s popularized usages, as they have 
developed, serves to limit particular forms of legal engagement. Most 
of these are by or on behalf of individual subjects or are directed 
towards state actors. Lawfare serves to resist or delegitimize these 
particular engagements. It serves to justify legal measures or policies 
that discount these engagements. Despite self-evident examples of 
international legal engagements that appear vastly preferable to 
warfare or the use of force, when one suggests that we have every 
reason to embrace lawfare it is necessary to understand what lawfare 
often means for the function and efficacy of international law, and the 
status of the individual or non-state actor. 
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